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hereditary ranks, must, in the judgment of an English snob, bt
too low in the scale of civilization, to deserve to have its law,
studied, or its constitutions understood. And hundreds of the
profession, practising in courts in which the writings and opinions
of Kent and Story are quoted with respect, have never troubled
themselves to inquire, as to the constitution or character of the
courts of whose learning and ability these were but fair exponents.
We might draw further illustrations of the truth of what we have
said, from the history of the late-renowned Alezandra Case, and
the speeches in the House of Commons upon neutrality laws, as
presented by the able criticisms of Mr. George Bemis, of Massachusetts, and others recently published. But our remarks have
already become extended beyond their original design, and we
content ourselves with the instance of Mr. Austin, one of the
fairest and least prejudiced of English jurists, who have made
our form of government the subject of comment when discussing
jurisprudence as a science.
E. W.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
LOCKHART & FREW VS. LIOHTENTHALER.
1. Where a passenger on a car or vessel is injured by the concurrent negligence
of his carrier and a third person, his remedy is solely against his carrier.
2. If however the negligence of the third party was the sole proximate cause
of the injury, and there was negligence of the carrier only in a general sense,
but which did not contribute to the injury, the third party is responsible.
3. Whether the defence of concurrent negligence can be heard without being
specially pleaded, quore.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
THOMPSON, J.-This was an action against the defendants
below, by the widow and children of John Lichtenthaler, under
the Acts of Assembly of 1851-55, to recover damages for occasioning his death by negligence. The allegations in substance
are, that the workmen or servants of the defendants in and about
their business, so carelessly and negligently conducted themselves,
in placing certain oil-casks so near the track of the Allegheny
Valley Railroad, that a portion of the train of cars, on which the
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deceased was at the time a passenger (in charge of the private
property of his employers), was, by reason of striking the casks,
thrown off the track and the deceased crushed to death.
To this charge the defendants pleaded not .guilty, with leave
to add, alter, or amend at bar, and gave evidence to show
negligence on part of those in charge of the train of cars, in
running at a dangerous rate of speed in view of the circumstances of the road at the time, and of -the manner in which the
train was made up.
It might be questionable whether such a defence as concurrent
negligence in the agencies producing the death, if it be a defence
at all, could be heard without being specially pleaded; but this
objection was not interposed below nor here, and we will not consider it, in what we have now to say. Indeed, all question on
this score was put out of the case, by the learned judge ruling,
and afterwards charging, that if the disaster resulted either
solely from the acts of the defendants through their servants, or
concurrently with those in charge of the train, in either event
the plaintiff would be entitled to recover.
This is a point not without difficulty. Wide differences of
opinion appear between judges in England as well as the United
States, in regard to it, some of which we propose to notice.
And in the outset, I may say, that measured by the preponderance of authority, I think the charge was clearly wrong. That
preponderance as certainly proves that in cases of injury to a
third person, arising from the mutual negligence of colliding carriages, trains, boats or vessels, the carrier vehicle, by which I
mean, that on which the injured party is, must answer for the
injury. I cannot doubt but that the deceased in the case in
hand, as he was not a servant of the railroad company, must be
considered in the light of a passenger, in charge of property
being conveyed with himself by the railroad company for his
employers. This raises the inquiry, whether the ruling and
charge of the court below are correct as to the law of this case.
The first English case I find on the point is Iranderplank vs.
Miller, 1 Mood. &Malk. 169, tried before Lord C. J. TECrERDEN,
in 1828. It was for damage to goods on board of a vessel, occasioned by a collision. The owner of the goods sued the owners
of the colliding vessel, and the defence set up was negligence on
part of the carrying vessel also. His lordship charged, , that
if there was want of care on both sides, the plaintiffs cannot
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maintain their action. To enable them to do so, the accident
must be attributable entirely to the fault of the crew of the
defendants." This decision appears to have been acquiesced in,
for it does not seem to have been carried further.
The same thing was ruled in the Court of Exchequer, in 1838,
in Bridge vs. The Grand Junction Railway, 3 M. & W. 247,
before Lord C. B. ABINGER, and Barons PARIKE and BOLLAND.
That was a suit for a personal injury. The plaintiff was a passenger on the Liverpool and Manchester train, and was injured
by a collision between that and the train of the defendants. It
is true the case finally went off on a question of pleading. But
the question was whether the defendants' plea sufficiently raised
the question of concurring negligence, and as it did not there
was a recovery against the defendants. The doctrine that mutual negligence throws the responsibility on the carrying party,
was fully admitted in the opinions of their Lordships.
The next cases which occur involving the question, are Thorogood vs. Bryan and Catlin vs. Hfills, reported consecutively at
pages 114 and 123, 65 Eng. Com.Law. The point was decided
in 1849 in Common Bench, on rules for new trials. The former
had been tried at Nisi Prius, before Sir CRESSWELL CRESSWELL
and the latter before WILLTAMS, J. The first was an action
against the owner of an omnibus, for the negligence of his driver
in killing a passenger alighting in the street from another omnibus. The other case was for an injury resulting to a passenger
from a collision between the Thames River steamers, by which
the plaintiff lost a leg. In both the-ion-carrying party was
sued, and the defence was negligence -on part of the carriers.
The rules were separately argued on'the same day, by different
counsel, and held under advisement for some time. Opinions
were delivered by the judges seriatim, oa- disposing of the motions, from which we extract pretty copiously.
COLTMAN), J., said: "The case of Thorogood vs. Bryan seems
distinctly to raise the question, whether a passenger in an omnibus is to be considered so far identified with the owner, that the
negligence on part of the owner or his servant is to be considered
the negligence of the passenger himself. If I understand the
law upon this subject it is this: that a party who sustains an
injury from the careless or negligent driving of another, may
maintain an action, unless he has himself been guilty of such negligence or want of care as to have conduced to the injury. In the
VOL. XIIL-2
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present case the negligence that is relied on as an excuse, is not
the personal negligence of the party injured, but the negligence
of the driver of the omnibus in which he was a passenger. But
it appears to me that having trusted the party, by selecting the
particular conveyance, the plaintiff has so far identified himself
with the owner and his servants, that if injury results from their
negligence he must be considered a party to it. In other words,
the passenger is so far identified with the carriage in which he is
travelling, that want of care on part of the driver will be a
defence of the owner of the carriage which directly caused the
injury."
MAULE, J., said: " It is suggested that a passenger in a public
conveyance has no control over the driver. But I think that
cannot with propriety be said. He selects the conveyance. He
enters into a contract with the owner, whom, by his servant the
driver, he employs to drive him. If he is dissatisfied with the
mode of conveyance, he is not obliged to avail himself of it.
According to the terms of his contract, he unquestionably has a
remedy for any negligence on the part of the person with whom
he contracts for the journey. It is somewhat remarkable that
actions of this sort are almost always brought against the rival
carriage or vessel, which is only to be accounted for by the partyspirit which more or less enters into every transaction in life.
If there is negligence on part of those who contract to carry the
passenger, those who are injured have a clear and undoubted
remedy against them." Short opinions were delivered by the
other judges to the same effect.
At a subsequent day, when, as the report shows, the court were
about to discharge the rule in Catlin vs. Bills, they were informed that the case had been compromised, and no order was
made. The authority of Bridge vs. The Grand Junction Railway (supra) was cited and recognised in both cases.
The next English cases to be noticed are, Bighy vs. Hewitt and
Greenland vs. Chaplin, determined in 1850, and consecutively
reported like the last two in 5 Exchequer, 239-243. They seem
opposed to the doctrines just cited. The opinion of C. B. PoLLOcOK is not very lucid, and although he seems to assert an opposite doctrine, yet the judgments in both cases were affirmed, whil6
in one tried before Baron ROLFE, he certainly did lay down the
rule, as held in the Common Pleas, at least in one of the aspects
of the case. I think, however, the rule announced in the Exche-
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quer stands opposed to the doctrine that concurrent negligence
on part of the passenger's vehicle with-that of the party sued is
a defence. There is quite a similarity in the general features of
these two cases and those in the Common Pleas. Both sets were
argued together and reported consecutively in their respective
reports. One case of each set was for injuries occurring by negligence of omnibus drivers, and one of each for injuries from
collisions between Thames steamers; the injury being precisely
the same in both, viz., the loss of a leg, resulting from exactly
the same sort of accident, and on board of the same steamer.
The only essential difference is in the names of the plaintiffs in the
last of the two cases.' The similarity almost raises a suspicion of
mistake in reporting. But that is hardly possible. It is certain,
however, that the Chief Baron makes no reference whatever to the
decision of the Common Pleas on the point, made more than a
year before.
In Smith vs. Smith, 2 Pick. 621, the ruling of the court was in
accordance with the doctrine of Thorogood vs. Bryan and Catlin
vs. Hills. So I find the same thing ruled in two cases in Ohio, The
Cleveland, Col. and Cin. Railroad vs. Terry, 8 Ohio 570 (1858),
and in Puterbaughvs. Reasor, 9 Id. 484 (1859). So in Brown
vs. The .
. Cent. Railroad Co., 31 Barb. 385, referred to in
the text of Redfield on Railways 333, as the law on the sfibject.
In Chapman vs. New Haven Railroad Co., 19 New York Rep.
141, decided in the Court of Appeals (1859), a contrary doctrine
was held, that the plaintiff might recover against a negligent
company, although there was concurring negligence on the part
of the train.
In Colegrove vs. The Harlem Railroad Co. and the ew Haven
Railroad Co., in the Superior Court of the city of- New York,
reported in 6 Duer 382, both companies were joined in an action
,ky the plaintiff for an injury resillting from a collision between
their respective trains. The jury found that both were negligent,
and the court entered judgment against both. The case wat
afterwards affirmed in the Court of Appeals, 6 Smith 492. But
the precise question now under discussion was not noticed in
the opinion of the Court of Appeals. The case turned on the
question of joinder. It was insisted"that both could not be joined
unless the negligence was joint; but the point was overruled.
Redfield has a note at page 333 referring to this decision, in
which he says, "it is certainly opposed to principle upon the
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point (of mutual negligence), and also upon the point of joinder
of the two companies in one action. But the difficulty may be
obviated by their code of practice."
This was doubtless so; for as the action was begun by complaint, it neither belonged technically to trespass nor case. If
the suit had been brought in case, there would have been a difficulty on the trial on account of the different rules of responsibility
existing between the defendants. The carrier-train would be
answerable for the slightest negligence, and held to the exercise
Qf the highest degree of diligence and care, while those in
charge of the other train, as to the plaintiff, would be held only
for the observance of ordinary care and diligence. Those principles however exist, let the form of action be as untechnical as it
might, and hence I am not quite able to comprehend how the
case could have been tried with any regard to logical or legal
principles. It was contended by some of the judges in the
Supreme Court, that the action must be regarded as a trespass,
for the force directly applied without regard to any joint interest,
and thus sustainable. Without stopping to point out difficulties
in this view of the case, I have only further to remark, that tle
question of concurring negligence between those in charge of
these two trains, and the effect of it, was not discussed in the
Court of Appeals. We have, therefore, but one decision of that
court in point, viz., Chapman vs. New Haven;.RailroadCo., supra,
and which seems to overlook the important element of concnrring,
negligence of those in charge of the carrying vehicle, vith the
other party sued, and the consequence of it.
The Turnpike vs. Stewart, 2 Metc. (Ky.) 119, was the case of a
passenger in a stage-coach, injured in passing the turnpike gate,
owing to the negligence of the gatekeeper. The defence was
negligence on the part of the driver in not haying his lamps lit.
The court said: - That if the injury was occasioned by the nega
ligence of both (the driver and gatekeeper), the fault of one is
no excuse for the other; both in that case are liable to the party
injured." So the learned and generally accurate editors of
Smith's Leading Cases, Vol. I., page 366, seem to think -,, it is
inconceivable that each set of passengers should by a fiction be
identified with the coachman who drove them, so as to be restricted
for remedy to one against their own driver or employer." These
are the authorities, English and American, outside of our state,
and in which I think the clear preponderance is in favor of the
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doctrine, that mutual negligence in case of an injury to a third
party is a defence.
I have been able to find but one case in our own reports bearing on this point, viz., Simpson vs. Hand, 6 Wh. 311. That was
an action for an injury to goods. The plaintiff had shipped
goods on board the schooner Thorne, at anchor in the Delaware.
She was run into in the night-time by the schooner William
Henry, and the owners of the latter were sued for the damage
done in consequence of the collision. The case was tried before
KENNEDY, J., at Nsi .Prius,who ruled that concdrring negligence was no defence. On certificate to the Supreme Court, the
case was reversed, solely on the ground of misdirection in this
particular. GIBSON, C. J., in delivering the opinion of the court,
cited Vanderplankvs. Miller, supra, and said, ", The force of that
decision is attempted to be evaded by supposing the owners to
have been their 6wn carriers, but nothing in the report gives
color to such a supposition; the owners of both goods and vessel
would scarce have brought their action for damages to the goods
alone. This case, therefore, is in point, and though it was tried
at Nisi rrius,the counsel seem to have been satisfied with the
verdict." He cited also Smith. vs. -Smith, 2 Pick., supra.
Further on he said: "The case put, of injury to a passenger
from a collision of stagecoaches, wants the essential ingredient
of bailment to complete the analogy; but I am not prepared to
admit that even he could have an action for mutual negligence
against any but him to whose care he had committed his person.
A common carrier is liable to his employer at all events; and to
make his associate in misconduct answerable for all the consequences of it, would make one wrongdoer respond in ease of
another for injury that both had committed. It is more just that
tl.e owner should answer to his employer, ratherthan one in whom
the employer reposes no confidence." As Mr., Justice KENNEDY
marked no dissent, we are to presume that he acceded to the
views expressed by the Chief Justice.
The case is not precisely identical in principle with the one
under discussion ; the difference is noticed by the Chief Justice,
but I conceive it is so strikingly analogous as to be authority.
The difference consists only in the degrees of responsibility
between carriers of passengers and common carriers of goods.
-Phe former are held to the exercise of the highest degree of care
and skill, the latter only to a slight increase of responsibility;
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the law defining the case for which he shall be exempt when loss
has befallen the property in his charge, and making him answer
for all the losses, however careful and prudent he may have been.
The reason of the rule is the same in both cases. It is the policy
of the law to insure safety as far as possible to both persons and
property, when being carried or transported from place to place
by public and common carriers. That can only be done by
enforcing a strict rule of responsibility upon those who undertake
such business.
I do not ihink, however, that the rationale of the principle that
concurring negligence leaves the party to look to his own employer, is satisfactorily expounded in the opinions of the judges
in Thorogood vs. Bryan, viz., the identity of the passenger with
his own vehicle. I would say the reason for it is, that it better
accords with the policy of the law to hold the carrier alone
responsible in such circumstances as an incejitive to care and
diligence. As the law fixes responsibility upon a different principle in the case of the carrier, as already noticed, from that of a
party who does not stand in that relation to the party injured,
the very philosophy of the requirement of greater care is, that
he shall be answerable for omitting any duty which the law has
defined as his rule and guide, and will not permit him to escape
by imputing negligence of a less culpable character to others, but
sufficient to render them liable for the consequences of his own.
It would be altogether more just to hold liable him who has
engaged to observe the highest degree of diligence and care, and
has been compensated for so doing, rather than him upon whom
no such obligation rests, and who not being compensated for the
observance of such a degree of care, acts only on the duty to
observe ordinary care, and may not be aware, even, of the presence bf a party who -might be injured. This rule, it cannot be
doubted, will be more likely to increase diligence than its oppositewhich would enable a negligent and faithless party to escape
the consequences 6f his want of care by swearing it on to another,
which he would assuredly do, if the temptation and opportunity
offered. As this view best accords with the policy of the law, it
is proof of the existetce of the rule itself.
If in this case there was no contributory negligence chargeable
to those conducting the train, with which the cars in charge of the
deceased were with himself being conveyed; in other words, if
their negligence did not directly contribute to the disaster,
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although there may have been negligence in a general sense, the
defendants will be answerable, if the acts of their servants or
agents were the proximate cause of it. The negligence on part
of the train which would be a defence must be directly involved
in the result; it must by itself or concurring with the defendants
be the proximate cause of the death. For instance, running too
rapidly on a road in bad repair, driving instead of drawing the
train, would not abstractly be such negligence as would be a
defence. To be such, the consequence of these acts or some of
them, must have directly entered into and become active agents
in the very disaster itself. This must be the rule of all such
cases: 1 Sm. Lead. Cases 365.
Because this 'ase was not put to the jury on the principles
herein stated, the plaintiffs in error have sustained their exception, and we are constrained to send the case down for a re-trial,
when doubtless they will receive the necessary consideration.
, The error assigned upon the exception to the rejection of the
,offer of the testimonylof an expert is entirely irregular; but as the
case goes back, we will say, we think the testimony should have
been received. What it may amount to is not for us to speculate
about. In a case like this to be effectual to any extent, it must
tend to show actual concurring negligence on part of the railroad
train. Whether it will do so or not will be for the jury, under
instructions from the court, to determine.
Judgment reversed, and venire de novo awarded.
I. The principle that he who to the
injury of another neglects a duty that
by law he ought to perform, is liable to
compensate the injury, is as old as the
common law. Yet it was not till the
case of Butterfield vs. Foster, 11 East
60, in the Court of King's Bench, in
1809, that the important doctrine was
distinctly announced, that notwithstanding the culpable negligence of the
defendant, the plaintiff could not recover if there was concurrent negligence, or such want of reasonable care
on his own part as contributed to the
injury. No sooner, however, was this
doctrine established than the courts
seemed inclined to push it to an extreme, and it came to be held that al-

most any negligence of the plaintiff
would prevent his recovery. The cases
appear to have run in that direction
until Bridge vs. Grand Junction Railway Co., 3 l. & W. 244, in 1838, in
which the Court of Exchequer decided
that though there may have been negligence on the part of the plaintiff, yet
if it was" not such as contributed to the
injury, or if he could not with reasonable care have avoided the injury, he
might recover. This case has been extensively cited and uniformly followed
in England and the United States, and
may therefore be considered to have
established the law on the subject,
though the true limitation, as remarked
by Baron PAintE in

this case, was
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clearly implied in Butterfield vs. Poster,
and bad been enunciated more or less
explicitly in numerous American cases:
Wood vs. Waterville, 4 Mass. 422; Bush
vs. Brainard, 1 Cowen 78; Smith vs.
Smith, 2 Pick. 621; Noyes vs. Morristown, 1 Ver. 353; Harlow vs. Humiston, 6 Cowen 189; Lane vs. Crombie et
el., 12 Pick. 177.
II. A very interesting and much more
doubtful question, however, is that
raised and decided in the principal
case; in the event of a collision of a
public conveyance by concurrent negligence of the driver or conductor and
a third person, by which a passenger is
injured without any personal fault of
his own, whether the passenger is so
far identified with his own driver that
he is barred in his action against the
third party by his driver's negligence.
This question naturally is of modern
origin, and the few cases in which it
has been raised are very thoroughly
examined in the principal opinion, but
the importance of the topic will justify
us in adding a few observations.
1. The rule that has obtained in
England and is adopted in the principal
case, has been founded upon the decision in Vanderplank et al. vs. Miller et
al., 1 Mood. & Malk. 169. This case is
reported very briefly, and it is noticeable that as has occurred in so many
other instances, it appears to afford a
very narrow foundation for the expanded doctrines that have been built
upon it. The syllabus takes no notice
of the ground that the plaintiff is barred
by negligence of his carrier, it is "In
an action for running down a vessel the
plaintiff cannot recover unless the injury is attributable entirely to the fault
of the defendants; if he were partly in
fault but the defendants with care
might have prevented the accident, he
cannot maintain his action." The report shows that the crew of the vessel

on which plaintiff's goods were bad
been negligent, but the important point
for the present inquiry, the identity of
the plaintiff and the crew, was assumed
in the charge of the Chief Justice, and
indeed throughout the case. The next
case relied upon for the lawr of this
subject is Bridge vs. Grand Junction
Railway. Co., 8 M. & W. 244, already
cited. In this case also, it is not a little remarkable, that the identity of the
plaintiff, who was a passenger, with the
managers of his train is assumed without question; but it appears plainly
from the report, and from the subsequent remarks of PAnKE, B., in Davies
vs. lMann, 10 I. & W. 546, that the
point in this case was as to concurrent
negligence, and the other question was
not at all considered. In the next case,
however, Thorogood vs. Bryan, 65 E.C.
L. 115, which professed to be founded
on those already cited, it was first explicitly determined that a passenger is
so far identified with his carrier, that
want of care on the latter's part will be
a defence to an action by the former
against the driver or owner of the carriage which directly caused the injury.
And it is noticeable that this decision
was notwithstanding the authority of
Keating and Willes, the editors of
Smith's Leading Cases (and both afterwards judges of this same court), who,
in a passage cited in the argument of
Cattlin vs. Hills, page 126, had put this
very case asan "inconceivable" resultof
what might appear, on a hasty perusal,
to be the doctrine of Bridge vs. Grand
Junction Railway Co. (Smith's Lead.
Cas. 132, a). The next cases are Rigby
vs. Hewitt, 5 Exch. 240, and Greenland
vs. Chaplin, Id. 243, in which we think
the same doctrine is substantially enunciated, though by no means so explicitly
as in Thorogood vs. Bryan. The forme.
was a case arising out of a race between
two omnibuses, but it appeared that the
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prozimate cause of the injury was the defendant's negligence, though the plaintiff's own driver was going at a pace
that might have constituted negligence
in a general sense, and the case therefore was well decided on that ground. In
the latter case the facts are very similar
indeed to Cattlin vs. Hills, argued with
Thorogood vs. Bryan, but the decision
is reconcilable with the last-named case,
and as the latter was cited by Humfrey
(arguendo, p. 245), the court would
never have passed over it in silence if
they had intended to overrule it. We
are disposed, therefore, to consider the
cases as consistent, though Mr. Justice
THOMPSON very frankly concedes their
apparent repugnancy, ad they have
not been considered by the professibn
in England as entirely in harmony.
These are the English cases directly
upon the point, and they appear to be
authoritative though they haie not yet
been entirely acquiesced in, as appears
from Tuff vs. Warman, 89 E. C. L. 750,
where WI.A

SA.zS,
J., alludes without

disapproval to the "damaging remarks"
of the editors of Smith's Leading Cases
on Thorogood vs. Bryan, and from
Waite vs. N. E. Railway Co., 96 E. C.
L. 725, where Thorogood vs. Bryan is
criticised in the argument, and Lord
CAIPBELL says: "we do not consider
it necessary to offer any opinion as to
the recent cases," &c., showing that
had the case then in their hands called
for a decision on the point, the court
would at least have heard an argument
against Thorogood vs. Bryan and its
kindred cases.
2. In the United States the question
does not seem to have been explicitly
determined until the present case, except in the states of New York and
Kentucky. In New York the decisions
of the various courts have been conflicting. In Knapp vs. Dagg, 18 Howard Pr. Rep. 165, a case tried at Nisi

Prius, in 1857, before BALco.T, J., of

the Supreme Court, it is said that the
passenger injured may have his action
against either of the wrongdoers, and
that negligence of his own driver is no'
defence to his action against the other.
In the same year the Superior Court
of New York, in Colegrove vs. Harlem
Railroad Co. et al., 6 Duer 382, held
that the passenger may sue both the
colliding companies jointly, and this
was affirmed on appeal, DEXbo, C. J, dis-

senting, 20 N. Y. 492, thoughthe principal question discussed in the Court
of Appeals was the propriety of a joint
action. In Brown vs. New York Central
Railroad Co., 31 Barbour 38.5, however,
the Supreme Court explicitly adopted
the English doctrine on the authority
of Thorogood vs. Bryan, and JOHNSOn,

J., says he is satisfied that the decision
in Knapp vs. Dagg is not law. But in
Chapman vs. New Haven Railroad Co.,
19 N. Y. 341, the Court of Appeals expressly rejected the authority of the
English cases, and held that a passenger is not identified with his carrier,
and may maintain his action against the
other train, though, the carrier-train
may have been guilty of such negligence as would have barred its action.
This must therefore be taken as the
present law of New York.
In Kentucky the only case touching
the point is Dianville, &c., Turnpike Co.
vs. Stewart, 2 Met. (Ky.) 119, in which
the Court. of Appeals say, "where an
injury is occasioned by the negligence
of two persons, the fault of one is no
excuse for that of the other. Both, in
that case, are liable to the party injured." No notice, however, is taken
of the doctrine that the plaintiff is
barred by the negligence of his carrier;
nor are any of the cases cited, though
the facts involved that very point.
In Pennsylvania the only analogous
case is Simpson vs. Hart, 6 Wh. 311,
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which is fully examined in the opinion
before us, and we, therefore, only add
that the principles on which it was decided, appear to tend strongly to the conclusions of the court in the present case.
It will be seen, therefore, that in
nearly all the states the question is still
an open one, and notwithstanding the
careful consideration it has received,
especially in Thorogood vs. Bryan and
in the present case, we cannot regard
the argument on either side as exhausted. The English, and as we may
now call it the Pennsylvania doctrine,
has undoubtedly the strongest basis on
technical grounds, and as following the
tendencies of ancient decisions, but it
may be seriously questioned, whether,
in the altered circumstances of modern
travel, the legal principles by which the
older cases were decided ought to apply
with the same force. Certainly nothing
could be more unsatisfactory than the
ground assumed as the basis of decision
in Thorogood vs. Bryan, that the passenger is to be identified with his carrier by reason of any technical "special
confidence" which he exhibits by his
choice of that mode of conveyance.
The whole modern system f travel and
intercommunication is at variance with
any such idea. The doctrine of the
case, therefore, receives a very material
accession of strength from the principle,
that "it better accords with the policy
of the law to hold the carrier alone responsible, as an incentive to care and
diligence," now first enunciated in the
able opinion of Mr. Justice THosnPsoN
as the basis of the decision. Whether
this consideration is important enough
to justify the narrowing of the remedy
to which the innocent party injured

would appear to be naturally entitled,
against either or both of the wrongdoers, we must still regard as open to
question.
And it is not improbable that the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania may
yet be called upon to examine, how far
the principles of the present case are in
harmony with those upon which their recent decision in Painter vs. City of Pittsburgh (3 Am. Law Rag. N. S. 350) was
founded.

Says Mr. Justice STrONO in

the latter case, "It is difficult to discover
any substantial reason:of good policy for
holding the present defendants responsible to the plaintiff. The negligence complainedof was not theirs. It does not
appear that they knew of it. The verdict determines that the fault was all
that of the contractors. Over them the
defendants had no more control than the
plaintiff's husband had. Thej were not
ina subordinaterelationto the defendantsneither servants nor agents. They were
in an independent employment, and
sound policy demands that in such a
case the contractor alone should be held
liable." The same principle would undoubtedly protect a passenger from an
action for the negligence of a railroad
company in whose cars he was travelling. and if the company's negligence is
not his, so as to subject him to an
action therefor, it is not easy to see
why it should be his so as to bat him
from an action against a wrongdoer
which he would otherwise have had.
But it may be that the cages can be
harmonized on the basis indicated by
Mr. Justice THOMPSON, an imperative
policy of the law requiring the carrier
alone to be responsible as an incentive
J. T. M.
to care and diligence.
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CASE OF THE GOLDEN ROCKET.
CHARLES E. DOLE et al. v8. MERCHANTS'

MUTUAL MARINE INSU-

RANCE CO.
1. When a portion of the subjects of a civil government have rebelled, and the
rebellion is of such magnitude that the military and naval forces have been
called out to suppress it, the fact that such rebels are robbers on the land, and
pirates on the sea, does not preclude them from being regarded as belligerents.
2. The seizure and destruction of a merchant vessel by such rebels, on the high
seas, is within the terms of a warranty in the margin of a policy of insurance,
by which the risk of "capture, seizure, or detention," is excepted from the perils
insured against.

The facts in this case sufficiently appear in the opinion of the
court, delivered by
DAVIS, J.-This is a suit upon a policy of insurance, on the
ship Golden Rocket, for one year, commencing November 19,
1860. On the trial it was proved that the ship was taken July 3,
1861, by the steamer Sumter, Captain Semmes, who claimed
her as a prize. He and his officers and crew stripped the ship
of her sails and spars, took her provisions and stores, and then
set her on fire, by which she was destroyed. The title of the
plaintiffs, due notice of the loss, and demand of payment therefor,
were admitted.
In defence, the company offered to prove that Semmes was
duly commissioned as Captain in the Navy of* the Confederate
States, and was acting under the authority thereof; that said
States had seceded from the United States, and had organized an
independent government; and that they were, at the time of the
loss, carrying on hostilities against the United States. This
evidence was excluded.
The case was then submitted to the court, and a default was
entered, to be taken off if the action is not maintainable, or if the
evidence excluded should have been admitted.
The insurance was against. "cperils of the seas, enemies, pirates,
assailing thieves, restraints, and detainments of all kings, princes,
or people, &c." Did this cover the loss ?
Of this there can be no doubt. It was a loss by enemies, or by
pirates. The plaintiffs claim that it was a loss by pirates ; the
defendants contend that it was a loss by enemies. It is not
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denied that the latter risk is excepted from the policy by the
marginal clause; therefore the action cannot be maintained, unless the act of Semmes was piracy.
I. Piracy being committed only on the high seas, was not a
crime of which the courts at common law had any jurisdiction:
2 Hale P. C. 18, 370. It was a capital offence by the civil law,
of which the admiral took cognisance. By the statute 28 Hen.
8, ch. 15, jurisdiction of this crime was conferred upon the common law judges. Since that time it has been spoken of as an
offence at common law. And certain offences not piracy by the
civil or the common law, have been made so by statute, both
in this country and in England.
It is contended for the defendants, that the word ",pirates," in
a policy of insurance, must be understood as referring to those
only who are guilty of piracy as defined -by the law of nations."
But we can perceive no ground for such a restriction. The parties to the contract must be presumed to have understood the
laws, at least of this country; and so far as any kind of piracy,
whether by the statutes or by the law of nations, could affect
marine risks, it must be considered as embraced in that term
when used in contracts relating to such risks, unless there is some
limitation or exception.
But in the case at bar, it is unnecessary for us to determine
whether the acts of Semmes and his crew were within the provisions of any statute. For the forcible taking of property from
the owner, on the high seas, appropriating all that can be of any
use, and destroying the rest, are clearly acts of piracy according
to the law of nations, or the common law, if committed by the
parties, and with the intent necessary to constitute that crime.
The common law writers define piracy as consisting of " those
acts of robbery or depredation upon the high seas, which, if committed upon the land, would have amounted to felony there:"
1 Hawkins' P. 0. ch. 37, § 4; 2 East P. C.796. It is, therefore, robbery on the high seas. This is the definition, in substance, given by the highest court in this country: United States
vs. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610. It is believed to be the only correct
definition of the offence.
There are eases in which courts, not in defining piracy, but in
describing pirates, have used very different terms. But such
descriptions, though generally correct in their application to the
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"ases under consideration, cannot properly be taken as tests by
;hich to determine any other case.
1. It is contended that the officers and crew of the Sumter
were not pirates, because they did not -seize, without discrimination, every vessel which tney chose to seize, regardless of national character."
Such are said to be the acts of pirates, in -Davison vs. Seal
Skins, 2 Paine C. C. 324. Molloy declares a pirate to be "ihostis
huinani generis," and the same language may be found in the
case of United States vs. Malek Adhel, 2 How. 200. It is there
said, that " he commits hostilities upon the subjects and property
of all nations."
This may, generally, be true in fact. But it by no means
follows that such indiscriminate hostility is necessary to constitute
the crime of piracy. Inthe case first cited, THOMPSON, J., says,
" the only difference between robbery and piracy is, that the sea
is the theatre of action for the one, and the land for the other."
No one has ever contended that a man could not be convicted of
robbery, unless he had a general purpose to rob everybody. Such
a rule is no more applicable to robbery on the sea, than on the
land. If an act of piracy is proved, it surely would not be a
good defence for the pirates; that their purpose was to seize vessels belonging to citizens of one nation only; or even that the
piratical enterprise was designed for the taking of only a single
ship.
Thus, if there is a mutiny of the crew, for the purpose of feloniously taking the ship, and they succeed, it is piracy: Brown
vs. SrMth, 1 Dow. Parl. Cases 349. The fact that pirates generally have a wider and more indiscriminate purpose, has given
rise to more general terms in describing what they do. But we
are not aware that any court has ever held an act of robbery
committed on the high seas not to be piracy or that any other
elements are necessary to constitute the offence.
2. But it is said that in the case at bar the taking was not
animo furandi,and that without such intent there can be neither
robbery nor piracy.
Common law Writers, from the time of Molloy, have applied
this term to the crime of piracy. It has also been so applied by
the courts in this country: United States vs. Smith, 5 Wheat.
153. But in the case of the Brig Malek Adhel, previously cited,
Judge STORY is careful to explain, that it is not essential that the
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act be committed for purposes of gain. " If one wilfully sinks
or destroys an innocent merchant ship, without any other object
than to gratify his lawless appetite for mischief, it is just as much
piratical aggression in the sense of the law of nations, and of the
Act of Congress, as if he did it solely and exclusively for the
sake of plunder, lucri causa."
When, by statute, jurisdiction of this offence was conferred
upon the common law courts, it was regarded as a felony. Some
authors speak of it as a ",marine felony." The taking was
charged as ",felonious" in the indictments, and the felonious
intent was presumed, or proved, as in common law offences.
When it said, therefore, that the taking must be animo furandi.
nothing more is meant than that, as in robbery on the land, it
must be with a felonious intent. In the case of Davison vs. Seal
Skins, before cited, it is said that, "the taking must be felonious." And in United States vs. Jones, 3 Wash. C. C. 209, 216,
WASHINGTON, J., says: , The felonious taking of goods from the
person of another, or in his presence, on the high seas, by violence, or putting him in fear, and against his will, is felony and
piracy by the law of the United States."
8. But it is argued that the taking was not felonious in this
case, for "what was done was for the purpose of prosecuting the
civil war." Because the officers and crew of the Sumter acted
under commissions issued by a de facto government, engaged in
levying war against the United States, it is said that they were
not pirates, but enemies.
That they were liable to be regarded as ,,enemies," is undoubtedly true. This implies the existence of "war."
But
every forcible contest between two governments, de facto or de
jure, is war. War is an existing fact, and not a legislative
decree. Congress alone may have power to "declare" it beforehand, and thus cause or commence it. But it may be initiated
by other nations or by traitors, and then it exists, whether there
is any declaration of it or not. It may be prosecuted without
any declaration; or Congress may, as in the Mexican War,
declare its previous existence. In either case it is the fact that
makes, enemies," and not any legislative act.
But in a civil war, those who prosecute hostilities against the
established government are also traitors. Their acts are robbery
or murder on the land, or piracy on the sea. There may be good
reasons, after the contest is closed, for absolving many of them
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rom their liabilities to punishment, as has sometimes been done
incases of rebellion. But this can be done only by the legislative power; nor does it change the nature of the crimes they
have committed. Their acts are not only acts of war, but also
of robbery, murder, or piracy. As was said by Judge SPRAGUE,
in the case of the Anzy Warwick, Law Reporter, April 1862,
,they are at the same timebelligerents and traitors, and subject to
the liabilities of both; while the United States sustain the double
character of belligerent and sovereign, and have the rights of
both. These rights coexist, and may be exercised at pleasure.
Thus, we may treat the crew of a rebel privateer as merely
prisoners of war, or as pirates and traitors." These views were
fully sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States:
Prize Cases, 2 Black 635.
An old writer has very clearly and concisely stated the law on
thiis subject:-" If subjects of the same state commit robbery
upon each other, on the high seas, it is piracy. If they are subjects of different states, if in amity, it is piracy; if at enmity, it
is not :" Sir LEOLINE JENKINS, cited in 13 Petersdorf 849, note.
The officers and crew 9 f the Sumter were either subjects of
the Unitefi States, or of some other government in amity with
ours. In either case they were pirates. It is not claimed that
they were not citizens of the United States. The fact that they
were citizens of states that have revolted, and are engaged in
civil war, did not change the nature of their acts, except to add
to their enormity. The commission under which they acted was
itself piratical, making all concerned in issuing it accessories
before the fact to all the piracies committed under it. The pretended government that authorized such a commission, being designed to overthrow the only rightful government, made treason
of all the robberies and murders committed by its authority, on
land or sea. When committed on the high seas they were piracy.
They were not the less piratical because they were belligerent.
The lesser crime was not merged in the greater: (ommonwealth
vs. Squier, 1 Met. 258. In being treason, such acts did not cease
to be robbery and piracy, thd same as if they had not been committed in execution of a conspiracy to subvert the government.
The intent of treason made them not the less, but the more felovious. The -case falls within that clause of the policy by which
the plaintiffs are insured against a loss by ",pirates," and they
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are entitled to recover, unless the loss is also within the exceptior
made by the warranty, in the margin.
II. The warranty in this case is not extrinsic or independent.
It is merely an exception, in the margin, of certain risks that are
specified in the bpdy of the policy.
"Warranted free from capture, seizure, or detention, or the
consequences of any attempt thereat, any stipulation to this policy
to the contrary notwithstanding."
It is worthy of attention, that neither of the words , capture,
seizure, or detention," is used in the body of the policy, in describing the perils insured against. The warranty, though intended to except some of the specified risks, does it in different
words from those used to describe the risks. It is this, only,
which makes the case one of difficulty or doubt.
The words used in the warranty are, indeed, also used in the
body of the policy in the memorandum clauses, whose office is
never to enlarge, but always to limit and circumscribe the risks
assumed: Potter vs. Insurance Co., 2 Sumner 197. But the use
of the word in these clauses does not afford much assistance in
determining their meaning in the warranty. For if certain kinds
of "seizure," as for a violation of the revenue laws, are excepted
in the memorandum clauses, there may still be other kinds of
seizure not therein excepted, which are excepted by the use of
the same word, without limitation in the warranty.
The body of the policy insures against " enemies." A loss by
them is a "ccapture."
This, therefore, is excepted by the warranty.
The body of the policy insures against "restraints and detainments of princes and people." Such a loss is by "seizure or
detention."
Therefore that is also excepted in the warranty.
The body of the policy also insures against "pirates."
If a
loss by pirates is either a "capture, seizure, or detention," that
is also excepted by the warranty. This is the exact question
presented.
These words, though sometimes used synonymously, differ in
the extent of their meaning-each embracing the one thatfollows
it, but not the one that precedes it. Every capture is a seizure
and a detention, and every seizure is a detention. But there
may be a seizure, as for some violation of revenue laws, which
is not a capture ; and there may be a detention, as by an embargo, which is neither a capture nor a seizure.
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This distinction has sometimes been overlooked, because a
seizure, or a detention without a seizure, may sometimes be equivalent to a capture, in giving the right to abandon for a. total loss.
It is difficult, therefore, in some cases, to determine the particular
signification of each word: Black vs. Marine Insurance Co., 11
Johns. 287; Wilson vs. Union Insurance Co., 14 Id. 227; Magoun vs. N. B. Marine Insurance Co., 1 Story 157.
Though there may be a case of - detention" that is neither a
capture nor a seizure, a loss by piracy is not one of that kind.
The question is therefore reduced to this :-Does the word
ccapture," or "cseizure," as used in contracts of marine insurance, embrace a taking by pirates.P If so, it is within the warranty, and the insurers are not liable.
That these words, as commonly used and understood, are bioad
enough to cover such a 'case, cannot be doubted: 1.Phil. Ifisurance, § 1110.
But it is argued that, as used in policies of insurance, they
have acquired.a particular meaning, which does not embrace such
a case. If so, that meaning must be given to them in the policy
under consideration. "If any terms in the policy have, by the
known usage of trade, or by use and practice, between the insurers and the assured, acquired an approprziate sense, they should
be construed according to that sense and meaning :" Gibson vs.
Colt, 7 Johns. 385.
The plaintiff contends that "seizure," as used in policies of
insurance, embraces only the acts of'some government, or of its
oflicers ; and that "capture" extends only to the acts of enemies
in a public war. Is the meaning of these words thus restricted,
when used in such contracts, so that both the parties must be presumed to have understood them in that sense? Is a capture
always a belligerent taking?
The English cases throw but little light on this question. In
.De Paiba vs. Ludlow, 1 Comyns 360, the ship was taken by
pirates, and was retaken nine days afterwards. The plaintiff
recovered for a partial loss. This taking his been called a
cc capture" by some authors: Marshall Insurance 424. But no
such point was decided; for the risk of pirates was expressly in,sured against, and there*was no exception by a warranty or otherwise.
In Goss vs. Withers, 2 Burr. 693, Lqrd MANSFIELD is reported
to have said that, "as between insurer and insured, a capture by
VOL. XII.-3
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a pirate is upon just the same footing as a capture by an
enemy."
The counsel for the plaintiff speak of this as a dictum; and
the counsel for the defendants seem to regard it as a decision
that a piratical taking is a capture. It is thus spoken of by
the Court of Queen's Bench in ileinworth vs. Shepard, 1 El. &
El. 447. But it is evidently a mistake. Lord MANSFIELD expressed no such opinion, unless we might infer it by his use of
the word "ccapture," in speaking of pirates. The question before
him was the right of the assured to abandon, in case of a capture
by an enemy. Their right to abandon in case of a taking by a
pirate, was admitted. And he said that, in regard to the right
of abandonment, the two cases were upon the same footing. The
remark was strictly applicable to the point under consideration;
and the correctness of it, as a rule of law, has never been denied.
In either case, the insured may abandon at any time before a recovery or a restoration.
In Naylor vs. -Palmer,8 Exch. 739, s. o. 10 Exch. 322, the
loss was by an insurrection of Coolie passengers. A similar loss
seems to have been held a case of seizure, in IKleinworth vs.
Shepard, before cited. In the latter case, the declaration alleged
it to be a loss by ," piracy," and this was admitted by a demurrer.
In the former case there was no such admission. It is doubtful
if the court, in either case, would have held it to be a loss by
piracy. The general clause in English policies is broader than
in most American policies, covering , all other perils, losses, or
misfortunes." And though these words have been construed lo
mean other perils of a like kind, they sometimes embrace losses
that otherwise would not have been covered by the policy: Cullen
vs. Butler, 5 M. & S. 461; Butler vs. Wildman, 3 B. & A. 898.
And the decision in Naylor vs. Palmerwas put, not on the ground
that the acts charged were actually piratical, but that they were
within the general clause in the policy. ,They were either
direct acts of piracy, or acts so entirely ejusdem generis, that if
not reducible to the specific words of the policy, they are clearly
included in the general words." The decision does not rest on
the ground that it was either a seizure or a capture.
Only one American case has been cited. In MeCongo vs. .
0. Insurance Co., 10 Rob. Lou. Rep. 202, 384, it seems to have
been held that a loss by an insurrection of slaves, who took the
vessel oi which they were being transported, and escaped, was 6,
1"s by capture or seizure. It is not easy to perceive how such a
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taking could be held to be piratical, even of the vessel, if it was
taken only for a temporary purpose, in order to escape. The
slaves might, however, be said to have seized the vessel. But we
ltould hardly be willing to assent to the conclusion that they
either captured or seized themselves, so as to render the insurers
liable for their value.
Two, only, of the cases cited, appear to have any direct bearing on the question before us. In Powell vs. iHyde, 34 Eng.
Law & Eq. 44, a British vessel was fired upon, by mistake, by a
Russian battery. The policy contained an exception of "capture,
and seizure, and the consequences of any attempt thereat." It
was held that the loss was within the exception, and that the insurers were not liable.
In IKleinworth vs. Shepard, before named, the taking was admitted by the pleadings to have been piratical. The policy contained a warranty in the same terms as in the case before us;
and the loss was held to be within the exception, so that the insured could not recover. No distinction can be perceived between
that case and the one at bar.
The plaintiffs rely upon the definition given to the word "ccapture," by the elementary writers upon the law of insurance, as
showing that it is not applied to a taking by pirates. But in this
respect such writers do not agree in their definitions, as may be
readily seen by a comparison.
Of those who apply it only to a taking by an enemy, are the
following:",
Capture, as applied to the subject of marine insurance, may
be said to be the taking of the ships or goods belonging to the
subjects of one country, by those of another, wfien in a state of
public war :" Park, ch. 4.
c"Capture, properly so called, is a taking by the enemy as a
prize, in time of open war, or by way of reprisals, with intent to
deprive the owner of all dominion or right of property over the
thing taken :" 2 Arnould, § 303.
"Capture may be said to be, as applied to this subject, the
taking of the ships or goods belonging to the subjects of one
country by those of another, in time of war. * * An aver,
meat of a loss by eaptire cannot be sustained, unless the ship
was taken jure belli:" Hildyard, Law and Eq. Lib. 288, 302..
Jacob, in his Law Dictionary, has followed Pqk, and numerous cases might be dited in which courts have used the word ia
.:
,this Benim.-..
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Other authors have used the word in a wider sense, embracing
piracy, and all other tortious takings.
"Capture is when a ship is subdued and taken by an enemy in
open war, or by way of reprisals, or by a pirate, with intent to
deprive the owner of it :" Marshall 422.
Phillips in his work on insurance, is somewhat indefinite; but
he says that the "words capture and detention are broad enough
to comprehend perils arising from pirates :" Vol. I., 2d ed., 651.
The same definition given by Marshall is repeated in 11 Petersdorf 180, and in Bouvier's Law Dictionary. Tomlins defines the
word as " the taking of a prey, an arrest, or seizure."
And piratical seizures have generally been called "captures,"
by eminent lawyers and judges, from Lord MANSFIELD'S day to
the present time: 1 Conk. Adm. 450; Manro vs. Almeida, 10
Wheat. 473. The same language is applied to pirates as to belligerents. They are called enemies-" hostes humani generis ;"
and are said to "commit hostilities upon the subjects of all nations." It is therefore natural and appropriate, that their depredations should be called " captures."
There can be no doubt that the words "capture and seizure,"
in their general signification, are broad enough to embrace a
taking by pirates. The plaintiffs rest their case upon the proposition that, in contracts of insurance, these words have acquired
a restricted meaning, which does not embrace such a taking.
The burden is upon them to establish the proposition; for words
are presumed to have been used in their general and ordinary
sense, unless the'contrary appears. Therefore, unless it is reasonably certain that the parties used and understood the words
in a restricted sense, we must construe them as they are generally
used and understood. And we cannot come to the conclusion
that they have acquired any special, limited, or restricted meaning. Applied to contracts of marine insurance, they embrace all
that, in their ordinary signification, they describe, so far as such
risks may be affected thereby. The fact that elementary writers
and courts have differed in their understanding or use of them,
unless we conclude that those who have used them in a broad and
general sense were in error, does not sustain the case for the
plaintiffs. This we cannot do. There may be a difference, with
no actual conflict. The word "capture" is properly applied to a
belligerent taking, as stated by Park. We believe it to be just as
properly applied to a piratical taking, as stated by Marshall; and
that an insurance against "capture" would cover both risks,
unless the parties specially exceptedone or the other.
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We might, perhaps, have based the decision on a different
ground, as stated in considering the first- question presented.
Though the taking, was piratical, it was also belligerent. War,
in fact, existed at the time of the loss. Hostile forces were
arrayed against each, other, in actual conflict. Its existence
would not have been more palpable or real, if it had been recognised by any legislative action. And though it was a civil war,
the taking was not the less a cdture for that reason.
But the other questions were legitimately raised by the facts
in the case, and th'ey have been argued by able and eminent
counsel. We have endeavored to give the subject the attention
it deserved, and have come to the conclusion that such a felonious
and forcible taking on the high seas was both piratical and belligerent, and in either case was a capture and a seizure, within
the terms of the warranty; and that the insurers are not liable.
The default is therefore to be stricken off, and the case to stand
for trial.
APPLETON, C. J., and KENT, WALTON, DICKERSON, and DANFORTH, J.J., concurred, holding that the taking, whether piratical
or not, was belligerent, and a capture.
CUTTING and BARROWS, JJ., dissented, holding that the taking
was piratical, but not a capture, seizure, or detention, as understood in contracts of insurance. *
We have received the foregoing opinion through the courtesy of Mr. Justice
D.vis, and lay it before our readers, as
an interesting and valuable discussion
of the point at issue, how far the acts
of the so-called Confederate Government, set up in the States seceded from
the National Government, are to be recognised and treated as those of enemies and belligerents, in giving construction to the provisions of a policy
of insurance. Although there was considerable division in the United States
Supreme Court in the decision of the
Prize Cases, 2 Black. 635, yet the determination in that case must be regarded,'as recognising the rule of law,
that the Confederate Government must
be treated as a belligerent, and the acts
of its armies and public ships, as belligerent acts, from the date of the President's Proclamation of Blockade, 27
April, 1861. The only ground of dis-

sent by Mr. Justice NELsoN and the

judges concurring in his opinion, was
in regard to the authority of the President to declare or recognise a state of
war between the Government and the
rebellious states, and whether that did
not require the Act of Congress under
the United States Constitution; all
agreeing that the rebels were to be
regarded as belligerents and enemies,
after date of the Act of Congress to that
effect. The state courts will naturally
follow the opinion of the majority of the
national tribunal of last resort, which
although not upon the precise point,
comes so near it as effectually to control it. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania have recently adopted the same
view upon this question as that contained in the foregoing case: Fifield vs.
Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania, Phila.
Legal Intelligencer, July 8th and 15th,
1864.
I. F. R.
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.DistrictCourt of the United States for the District of New Jersey.
September Term, 1864.
THE UNITED STATES VS. THE SCHOONER ETTA.

The sale of a vessel of war by a belligerent to a neutral during hostilities is'not
valid as against the other belligerent.

A. Q. Keasbey, .U. S. District Attorney, for the United States.
1. The proof shows beyond doubt that this vessel was the rebel
privateer Retribution,- and was liable to seizure and forfeiture for
some, or all of the causes set forth in the libel; and having been
so liable, these claimants must show that they have acquired
such a title as purges the forfeiture, and gives them the abno.
lute ownership, and the burden of proof is upon them: The
Emulous, 1 Gall. 563; Ten Hogsheads of Bum, 1 Id. 187; The
Short Staple, 1 Id. 104; The Eliza, 2 Id. 4. Untewt hey show
a valid title their claim must be dismissed, and they have- no
concern with the disposition bf the vessel, or the form of pro"
heeding.
2. They simply allege that they bought in good faith, of a
British subject at -Nassau, who bought at an auction, under a
condemnation by. surveyors for unseaworthiness, made at the
request of the rebel captain. If we admit this to be true, the
question remains, does such a title shield her from forfeiture,
and require a return of the vessel ?
8. This title is invalid. Fir8t: because she was originally
captured by the rebels from the United States; and if they are
to be treated as pirates, she was stolen, and no title could pass
from them.
Second. If they are to be treated as belligerents, and gained
title by capture, they used her to aid the rebellion, and she
became liable to forfeiture, and any transfer was void under
6th section of Act of July 17, 1862, 12 Stat. 590. And the
forfeiture took effect on the commission of the offence, and
avoids subsequent sale to an innocent purchaser; unless the
statute is in the alternative, and forfeits the article or its value,
the forfeiture relates back to the bommission of the offence; U. S.
vs. Grundy, 8 Cr. 837 ;- U. S. vs. 1960 Bags, 8 Id. 898 ; U. S.
vs. Mars, Id. 417 ; aelton vs. Hoyt, 8 Wh, 246 ; Caldwell vs.
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U. S., 8 How. 366; which cases overrule the decision of Judge
in Th Mars, '1 Gall. 192.
Third. If the transfer to a neutral purchaser in good faith,
was not void by the statute, yet she was prize of war, and no
sentence of condemnation is shown; and until such sentence, no
valid title can be made by the captors: The Flad Oyen, 1 Rob.
135; Jecker vs. Montgomery, 13 H. 516, and 18 Id. 110; The
Falcon, 6 Rob. 198; The Kierlighett, 3 Id. 97; The Dawn,
Ware 485; The Estrella, 4 Wh. 298; The tos. Segunda, 5 Id.
838; .The Astrea, 1 Id. 125.
4. The sale of this vessel by an enemy to a neutral was illegal.
Such sales of merchant ships, though sometimes held valid in
England and this country, are always regarded with extreme
suspicion: The Bernon, 1 Rob. 102; The Arqo, Id. 158; The
Sechs Geschwigterx, 4 Id. 101; App. to 2 Wheaton 30. But
the sale of an enemy's vessel of war to a neutral, has been held
by Lord STOWELL to be absolutely illegal: The Minerva, 6 Rob.
896. And this doctrine is approved by Judge STORY in App. to
2 Wheaton 31, and should now be judicially adopted in this, the
first case that has arisen in this country.
5. Treating her as the absolute property of the rebels the title
of the claimants is invalid; 1st. Because even if they were innocent purchasers without notice, and the rebel captain was the
duly authorized master, he had no power to sell the ship. A sale
under condemnation for unseaworthiness can be valid only in
cases of extreme necessity, where the vessel, cannot be repaired,
and it must be optima fide: Schooner Tilton, 5 Mason 465.
And there must be a judicial condemnation, and even then, courts
will look behind it into all the facts: 1 Parsons' Mar. L. 66, 2
Id. 643, and cases cited: The Flad Oyen; The .Dawn, ubi iup.
Here was no extreme necessity, no condemnation, but a sham
survey, a mere cloak for the desired sale. But the captain was
not authorized to sell her under any circumstances. Such a condemnation and sale of a national war vessel would be illegal anywhere.
And their title is invalid; 2d. Because the testimony clearly
shows that they were not bond fide or innocent purchasers, without notice. They had full notice of her character and history,
.and were bound to know that they could not acquire a valid title.
They could acquire no title if there was even enough to put them
on inquiry: The Ploughboy, 1 Gall. 41; The Tilton, 5 Mason 495.
STORY
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6. To establish this claim would be to form a precedent dangerous to us, and invaluable to the rebels. They would find
pliant surveyors in every neutral port, and a ready market for
all their prizes, and for all their war vessels when disabled or
hard pressed by our cruisers.
In reply to a suggestion by Mr. Edwards that the Sumter and
the Georgia had been dismantled and sold, with the sanction of
the British authorities, Mr. Keasbey replied, that no judicial
confirmation of such sales had taken place, and that if those vessels should be overhauled by our cruisers, they would certainly
be seized, ind then the very questions in this case would remain
to be decided in our courts.
Charles Edwards, of New York, for claimants, after objecting to the testimony of the informer, and to certain hearsay
evidence, made the following points:1. The Etta had become British property unconditionally,
and the only question should be whether a bond fide buyer
of a vessel in a neutral port, getting a title through British law,
has to look further than liens. She had become British property
before they purchased her, and they bought her of a British
subject in a neutral port, and complied with all the requirements
of British law, to make her a British vessel.
2. She had been condemned as unseaworthy by a competent
board of surveyors, and ordered to be sold. The unseaworthiness
of the vessel, coupled with the survey, sale, and register to
Stead, the purchaser, granted by the custom house at Nassau,
vested the property in him: Gordon vs. Insurance Co., 2 Pick.
264 ; and the British title of the claimants is also perfectly clear.
She was purchased bondfide and purely with a view to use her in
peaceful neutral commerce.
She does not appear to have had a warlike character at any
time while she was at Nassau. Her seizure was that of a vessel
of a country at peace with the United States. It was a tortious
seizure, and restitution ought to be made: Talbot vs. Tansen, 3
Dall. 133.
3. But even if she had borne the character of an enemy,
honest change of ownership rubbed off enemy property. Enemy's
ship may be bought by a neutral: The Sechs aeschwistern, 4
C. Rob. 100; The Johanna Enilia,Spink's Prize Appeal Cases
16, and same case in 29 Eng. L. & E. 562; Opinions of Attorney-
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Generals, Vol. VI., 652, and VII., 538; The Ocean Bride,

Spink's Prize Appeal Cases- 79.
4. The charges against the vessel are of a criminal character,
and must be proved by strict legal evidence, and the wrongful
actors must be shown to be the owners ; this must be done before
the United States can have any standing, and yet even when it
is done, we insist that she cannot be held.
5. Even if prior wrong committed is proved, yet she is not to
be condemned unless she had a criminal character at the time of
her seizure: U. . vs. 1960 Bags of Coffee, 8 Cr. 398; U. S. vs.
Mars, Id. 417; The Saunders, 2 Gall. 210; U. S. vs. The 31anginate, 8 Or. 856; U. S. vs. Grundy, Id. 337; Santissima
Trinidad, 7 Wh. 283. She had no such hostile character, or
warlike vitality about her when first put up for sale at Nassau,
but was even for peaceful purposes, unseaworthy.
6. There can be no confiscation under the Act of August 6,
1861, unless upon legal proof of ownership, and illegal acts done
by the owners. There is no such proof; and if condemnation is
sought under the Act of July 17, 1862, the test of property must
be of the time of the seizure. There is nothing in the act which
forfeits unconditionally from the date of the statute.
7. If the vessel was seized by the rebels and used in piratical
aggressions, she is clearly not condemnable; her old ownership
would c~ntinue; the principle applied to The Chesapeake Case
would apply here. Pirates have no ownership: 1 Kent 184; 2
Dods. 369; 1 W. Rob. 483; Haggard .143.
8. It is not proved that she attempted to run the blockade,
but, if she had, she cannot be tried for it on the instance side of
this court, nor even in a prize court, for she had ended any such
voyage: Manning's Law- of Nations 328; Wheaton's Int. Law,
pt. 4, ch. 3, § 13; 7 Wh. 348.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FIELD, District Judge.-This is an information filed by the
district attorney, in behalf of the United States, and of Daniel
Howell, against the Schooner, now called the Etta, but lately
known as the Retribution, seized at Jersey City, on the 1st day
of September, 1863, for' an alleged forfeiture under the laws of
the United States.
The libel, after reciting the existence of an insurrection against
the Government of the United States, and the Proclamation of
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the President of the 15th of April, 1861, proceeds to allege five
distinct grounds of forfeiture. 1st. That Vernon 0. Locke and
Thomas Jones, and other persons unknown, have acquired, purchased, sold, and given the said vessel, with intent that the same
should be used and employed in aiding and abetting-such insurrection, in violation of the 1st Section of the Act of August 6,
1861, entitled "An Act to confiscate property used for insurrectionary purposes."
2d. That in violation of the same section, the said Vernon C.
Locke and Thomas Jones and others, being the owners of said
vessel, hae used and employed her in aid of such insurrection.
3d. That the said vessel was the property of Vernon 0. Locke
and other persons unknown, acting as officers of the navy of the
rebels, in arms against the government of the United States, and
therefore liable to seizure under the 5th section of the Act of
July 17, 1862, entitled "An Act to suppress insurrection, to
punish treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate the property
of rebels, and for other purposes."
4th. That the said vessel was the property of Vernon C. Locke
and others, holding certain offices and agencies under the govern.
ment of the so-called Confederate States of America, and therefore liable to seizure, under another clause of the same section
of the Act of July 17, 1862.
5th. That the said vessel was purchased, fitted out in 'whole or
in part, and held, for the purpose of being employed in the commission of piratical aggressions and depredations, and in the
commission of other acts of piracy, as defined by the law of
nations, in violation of the 1st section of the Act of August 15,
1861, entitled "An Act supplementary to an act entitled 'An
Act to protect the commerce of the United States, and punish
the crime of piracy.' "
A claim is interposed by Gustave Renouard and Byron Bode,
who allege that they are merchants, residents of Nassau, New
Providence, British subjects, and bond fide owners of the said
schooner Etta. That in the month of February, 1863, while the.
said schooner Etta, then called the Retribution, was in the port
of Nassau, she was deemed unseaworthy, and a survey was duly
had in Nassau upon her by competent shipbuilders and shipping
merchants. That in consequence of such survey, and by order
of the board of survey, she was in the said mouth of February,
1863, sold by public auction in Nassau to Thomas Stead of the
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same place, a British subject, who continued to hold and own her
until about the 20th day of July thereafter, when he caused
her to be sold by public auction at Nassau, at which sale these
claimants bought her, in good faith and for a valuable consideration. That on the 2d day of July, 1863, and on the completion of such purchase, they received a bill of sale of her from the
said Thomas Stead, took possession of her, and have been her
sole owners ever since, no other persons having any share,'interest,
or ownership in her. They also allege, that since they have
owned the said vessel she has not been engaged in any illegal or
piratical voyage, hnd that they have not been privy to or interested in any prior illegal or piratical voyage, and that they have
never used her at any time in contravention of any statute of the
United States, or been privy to or interested in any such contravention.
It is to the question of the validity of this claim that the arguments of counsel have been chiefly directed.
Now the first, and by far the most important question in this
case, according to the view which I take of it, is this, What was
the character of this vessel ? Was she a merchant vessel, or was
she an armed vessel of war in the service of the Confederate
States ? As the judgment I am to pronounce will depend in a
great measure upon the solution of this question, I propose to
examine somewhat in detail the evidence bearing upon it. We
have in the first place the testimony of Daniel Howell. The first
time he ever saw the vessel was at Nassau, in March, 1863. She
was at Cochran's Anchorage. He saw her through a glass, while
lying there. She appeared like an ordinary schooner with a gun
amidships. When she came into the harbor, he went on board
of her. She was not I.hen armed, but there were indications that
she had been. There was a track on the deck for a swivel gun.
It looked as if it had been used for that purpose. She was a
fore and aft schooner, and had the appearance of having been
altered from a propeller. The filling in at the stern, where the
propeller had been, indicated it. He saw the captain on board.
He went under the name of Captain Parker, but his real name
was Vernon C. Locke. The captain told the witness that the vessel
was the privateer Retribution; that she was originally the propeller
" Uncle Ben," and had been taken from the Yankees. He said,
he had knocked some half dozen vessels of the Yankees to pieces.
He showed witness some chronometers which he said he had

UNITED STATES vs. SCHOONER -ETTA.

taken from the Yankees. He had six himself, and his first
lieutenant, whose name was Gray, had four or five. But these
declarations of Parker, it is said, are nothing but hearsay evidence, and therefore inadmissible. This may be so, and even if
they were not, we should feel disposed to receive with many
grains of allowance, the boastful account given of his exploits by
this rebel captain. But what the witness saw himself is certainly
evidence. There were the indications that the vessel had been
originally a propeller ; that she had been altered to, a schooner;
that she had been armed. There were the chronometers. They"
told their own tale, of American mercbantmgn plundered and
destroyed. They were the customary trophies of rebel privateers.
The witness saw the vessel every day until the latter part of
April, when she went out, as he says, to run the blockade. She
had then another captain on board named Jones. She went out
to go to Wilmington, as the captain said. She cleared at the
custom house for St. Johns, -as all the runners of the blockade
do." I quote the language of the witness. She was loaded with
salt; the witness might have added, as all the blockade runners
are. The witness was on board, and saw the salt. About ten
days after she came into port again. She was in the same condition in which she had gone out, minus her salt. The witness
went on board of her. She had lost her cargo. The'captain
told him, that just as he got out, a steamer sighted him, and in
running away from her he shipped so'much sea, that he lost all
his cargo. Now here again, what the captain told him may be
hearsay, but what he himself saw is competent evidence. She
cleared for St. Johns. She had a cargo of salt on board. She
came back in ten days without it. Such an explanation of these
facts, as the captain is represented as giving, is certainly not im,probable, and might,.perhaps, he fairly inferred even without any
direct evidence. This witness also states that when the vessel
first came to Nassau, the captain told him he was going to get
her condemned and have her sold; that it was a very easy matter
to get a vessel condemned. Now it turns out in point of fact,
that the vessel was condemned; and the process by which it was
effected shows that the operation was not a difficult one.
But, it is contended by the counsel for the claimants, that
Howell is an informer, and has) therefore, a direct interest in
procuring a'sentence of condemnation ; and on that account is
.an incompetent witness. ButI I do not understand this to be the
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rule of law. On the contrary, it is laid- down by Greenleaf, in
his Treatise upon Evidence, that the fact of a witness for the
prosecution being entitled to a reward from the Government
upon conviction of the offender, or to a portion of the fine or
penalty inflicted, is not admitted as a valid objection to his competency. "The public," he observes, "chas an interest in the
suppression of crime and the conviction of criminals. It is with
a view to stir up greater vigilance in apprehending, that rewards
are given, and it would defeat the object of the legislature, to
narrow the means of conviction by means of those rewards, and
to exclude testimony which otherwise would have been admissible:"
1 Greenleaf on Evidence, § 412. The interest which this witness
has in the event of the suit, may detract somewhat from the
credit to which his testimony is entitled, and may cause it to be
received with a certain degree of jealousy. But I see no reason
to doubt the substantial truth of his- statements. In all important
particulars, they are abundantly confirmed by the testimony of
other witnesses.
Eppes Sargeant lives at Nassau, and is clerk of the Dry Dock
in that city. Thinks the vessel came in the last of February or
first of March, 1863. She came in at Cochran's Landing and
lay there some time. He saw her when she came into the harbor.
He saw a circle on her, where it appeared a gun had traversed.
It was where they carry pivot guns. He knew of no other purpose for which such a mark could exist. She was advertised for
sale by Adderly & Co., as the Confederate Schooner Retribution.
Witness saw the advertisement. Adderly & Co. were agents for
most of the rebel steamers. The Retribution was universally
known and spoken of as a rebel privateer. From a conversation
he had with Mr. Bode, one of the claimants, witness supposed he
knew all about her. Witness remarked to him, on learning she
was coming to New York, that he bought her on purpose to make
trouble between the two governments, knowing that she had been
a privateer, and that she probably would be seized as soon as she
arrived. His answer was, "if they seized her, he would make
them pay well for her." He did not deny that he knew she had
been a privateer.
Thomas Samson is a detective in the treasury department
at New York. He was. in the Bahama Islands in the spring
of 1863; was sent by Board of Underwriters and Marshall
to look after blockade runners. He first saw the schooner
Retribution on the south side of Long Key. She was a rebel
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privateer, and armed. Remembers distinctly seeing one, and he
thinks two, guns on board of her. Saw two of the officers of the
vessel, the first and second lieutenants. Had a conversation
about the difficulty between the North and the South. The
captain of the Retribution said, "they bad done nothing more
than ihe North had." This was about the 15th of February,
1863. The witness next saw the Retribution, about a month
afterwards, at Cochran's Anchorage, about five miles from the
city of Nassau. She had no guns then. The Retribution was
publicly and generally known at Nassau as a rebel privateer. It
was as notorious as anything could be. Nobody doubted it.
Such is an outline of the evidence adduced on the part of the
libellants touching the character of this vessel. Is it contradicted
by the witnesses who have been examined on the part of the
claimants? So far from this, it is confirmed in almost every par.
ticular.
. Byron Bode, one of the claimants, on his cross-examination
says: "The Etta was known as the Retribution, when she
arrived at Nassau. I heard that she had been a propeller, hnd
altered to her present state and shape as a schooner." '
Charles I. Marshall says: - I heard that the Etta had been a
privateer. I believe it was publicly known at Nassau."
George D. Harris says: cI believe the vessel to have been
once employed in the service of the Confederate States as a privateer, under the name of the Retribution. I think it probable it
vas known at Nassau, although I really don't know that it was.
I knew Captain Parker in command of her when she was the
Retribution. She was called the Retribution when she arrived."
In the copy of the register granted to Thomas Stead, she is
described as foreign built-her name Etta-ind her foreign name
Retribution.
William Sawyer, who was the harbor master at Nassau, and
one of the surveyors upon whose report she was condemned, says:
"cThe vessel was called the Retribution when I saw her first. It
was said then that she was a Confederate vessel of war."
The testimony of Edward B. A. Taylor too upon this point is
verr significant, and must, I think, remove all doubt as to the
true character of this vessel. He was the Acting ReceiverGeneral, and Registrar of Shippipg at Nassau, and was examined
as a witness upon the part of the claimants. " The Retribution,"
lie says, "cdid not enter as a trader in this port of Nassau. She

UNITED STATES vs. SCHOONER ETTA.

was treated as a Confederate vessel of war. Such vessels do not
pass the receiver-general's office at all." .
From all the evidence then in this case, it is impossible to
resist the conviction, that this vessel was an armed vessel of war
in the service of the Confederate States. She was probably as
well known at Nassau, as the Sumter at Gibraltar, or the
Georgia'at Liverpool. Could then the claimants, who are British
subjects residing at Nassau, acquire a valid title to her, by a bill
of sale, or in any other way?
It is really the case of a purchase by a neutral, of a vessel of
war belonging to a belligerent, while lying imprisoned in a neutral
port, from which there was no escape without peril of capture.
I use the terms -neutral," and "belligerent," as descriptive of
the relation which subsists between the claimants and the Confederate States, because, by her Proclamation of Neutrality, of
the 18th-of May, 1861, the Queen of England recognised "hostilities as existing between the government of the United States
of America, and certain states styling themselves The Confederate States of America ;" and the Supreme Court of the United
States have decided, that after such an official recognition by the
sovereign, a citizen of a foreign state is estopped from denying
the existence of a war with all its consequences as regards
neutrals: Prize Cases, 2 Black 669.
This question, as to the right of a neutral to purchase an
enemy's vessel of war, would, at any time, and under any circumstances, be a question of importance ; but it derives an
especial interest from the nature and character of the war in
which we are now engaged, and which would render the exercise
of such a right, supposing it to exist, peculiarly liable to abuse.
It is a matter of some surprise, that a question confessedly so
important, and one too so likely to arise, should not have received
a larger share of attention from writers on international law, and
that it should not have been the subject of more frequent judicial
determination. And yet, With the exception of the case of The
1Minerva, decided by Lord STOWELL in 1807, and which has been
silently adopted as an authority by subsequent text writers, it
has never, so far as I have been able to ascertain, been the
subject either of legal discussion or of legal adjudication.
With regard to the purchase of merchant vessels belonging to
a belligerent the case is otherwise. The question has frequently
-urisen, and there -are repeated decisions in reference to it in the
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English Courts of Admiralty. The law, however, upon this
subject varies in different countries. The 7th article of the
French regulations of the 26th of July, 1778, which is still in
force, provides, that enemy-built vessels cannot be reputed to
belong to neutrals, unless there is documentary proof found on
board, that the sale to a subject of an ally or neutral was made
before the commencement of hostilities. This regulation is thus
defended in a recent French treatise, in answer to the question,
of what importance it is, whether enemy's vessels have beeh sold
to neutrals before or after hostilities. -Belligerents, in desiring
in maritime wars to appropriate to themselves ships of their
enemies, do not wish that the latter should, to avoid capture and
confiscation, realize the capital which their vessels represent.
All enemy's vessels pursued by cruisers, and in danger of being
captured, would take refuge in neutral ports, and in order that
they might not be captured, their owners would sell them to
neutral citizens." See Lawrence'o Wheaton on International
Law, 581, note.
The Russian rule would seem to be the same as the French.
In England, however, the validity of such purchases has been
sustained, not however without much discussion, and some hesitation of opinion. They are allowed to be legal, but obnoxious
to much suspicion, and courts will always feel it to be their
duty to look into them with great jealousy: The Bernon, 1 0.
Rob. 102; The Sechs Geschwistern, 4 C. Rob. 101.
Such too would appear to be the law in the United States: 2
Wheat. Rep., Appendix, 450. Opinions of Attorneys-General,
Vol. V1., p. 652; Id. Vol. VII., p. 538.
Of course, in countries like France and Russia, where the
transfer of an enemy's merchant ships is held to be illegal, the
purchase of ships of war belonging to an enemy must be deemed
illegal also. For every possible reason which could be .assigned
for the one, would apply with tenfold force to the other. But
how is it in England and the United States, where the purchase
by a neutral of an enemy's merchant vessel is not in general
illegal? Is the right of purchase confined to merchant vessels,
or does it extend also to vessels of war?
,
There is, as I said before, but a single adjudged case, in which
the question seems to have arisen. It is the case of The Minerva,
decided by'Lord STOWELL, and reported in 6 C. Robinson 396. It
was the case of a vessel under Kniphausen colors, and claimed
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by Count Bentinck, Lord of Kniphausen, as a ship purchased
by him, in April, 1807, in the port of Bergen. She had been a
Dutch ship of war, belonging to the Dutch East India Company,
and had been chased into North Bergen after an action with a
British frigate, and had been lying in that port for nearly three
years. Count Bentinck was allowed to appear in person before
the court, and explain the circumstances of the transaction. He
stated that the vessel had been long ago disposed of, at the
breaking up of the Dutch East India Company, to individuals,
on whose account she had since continued in the port of Bergen;
and that it was from these persons, and not from the government
of Holland, or from any public company, that the purchase was
made. It was also stated that the vessel was purchased for the
purpose of being employed in the West India trade to St.
Thomas; and that she was on her way from Bergen to. Kniphausen when she was captured.
Here then was the case of a vessel, not belonging to the
Government of Holland but to the Dutch East India Company;
a vessel that had been lying for nearly three years in a neutral
port; that had been sold, a long time before, upon the breaking
up of the company, to individuals, from whom she was purchased
by a sovereign prince for the purpose of being employed in a
legitimate trade. If, under these circumstances, the purchase
was illegal, it would be difficult to imagine any possible case, in
which the transfer of an enemy's war vessel to a neutral could
be deemed lawful. And yet Lord STOWELL rejected the claim,
and held the transaction not to be legal.
"cThe first question," he says in delivering his judgment, " is
whether such a purchase can be legally made? I am not aware
of any case in this court, or in the court of appeal, in which
the legality of such a purchase has been recognised. There have
been cases of merchant vessels driven into ports out of which
they could not escape, and there sold, in which after much discussion and some hesitation of opinion, the validity of the purchase
has been sustained. Such cases, I believe, did occur during the
*first war, in which I attended this court or the court of appeal.
But whether the purchase of a vessel of this description built for
war, and employed as such, and now rendered incapable of acting
as a ship of war, by the arms of the other belligerents, and driven
into a neutral port for shelter, whether thd purchase of such a
ship, I say, can be allowed, which shall enable the enemy so far
VOL. XIII.-4
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to rescue himself from the disadvantages into which he has fallen,
as to have the value at least restored to him by a neutral purchaser, is a question on which I shall wait for the authority of
the superior court before I admit the validity of such transfer.
That a private merchant could lawfully do this, I shall not hold,
till I am so instructed by the superior court. That a sovereign
prince should embark in such a transaction, unless under such
guards as would effectually remove all possibility of abuse, is
what, but for the instance before us, could scarcely have been
expected. Some communication, at least we might suppose,
would be made to the belligerent' government, accompanied with
a disclosure of every circumstance of caution that should exclude
the suspicion of what is always to be apprehended, the danger of
such a vessel finding her way back again into the navy of her
own country."
The judgment in this case was not appealed from ; its correctness, so far as I know, has never been called in- question ; and
the principle involved in it has since been adopted by English
text-writers as a settled rule of international law: 2 Wildman's
International Law 90; .Hasack's Rights of Neutrals 81; Hazlitt
& Roche's Manual of International Law 209.
In this country the question seems never to have received a
judicial determination; but in the appendix to the second volume
of Wheaton's Reports, which is now known to have been writtel
by Judge STORY, after stating that the purchase by neutrals of
enemies' ships during war is not in general illegal, the author
adds: -But the right of purchase by neutrals, extends only
to merchant ships of enemies; for the purchase of ships of war
belonging to enemies is held to be invalid." And the case of The
Minerva is referred to as an authority for this position.
We have then the highest legal authority, both in England and
this country, for the doctrine, that the purchase by a neutral of
an enemy's ship of war is illegal. When Lord STOWELL and
Judge STORY agree, upon a question touching belligerent rights
and neutral responsibilities, he must be a bold man that would
venture to differ. But the doctrine is sustained by reason as well
as hy authority. And perhaps no case could furnish a better
illustration of the wisdom and propriety of the rule, than the one
now under consideration. Here is an armed vessel, in-the service
of the Confederate States, which after preying upon our commerce with a boldness and success which almost commands admi-
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ration, takes refuge from the vigilance of our cruisers in the
neutral port -of Nassau. Deterred from venturing out for fear
of capture, she is stripped of her armament, purchased by a
citizen of Nassau, obtains a British register under a new name,
clears for a neutral 'ort, and then endeavors to run the blockade,
and make her way back to a hostile port, where she may be
repaired and refitted as a vessel of war, and again sally forth
upon a new career of plunder and depredation. A vessel under
such circumstances cannot be a legitimate subject of commercial
speculation. A neutral who purchases her, whatever may be his
motives, does it at his peril. He may design to devote her to
peaceful commerce, but the warlike character once impressed still
adheres to her. He may call her the "Etta," but she is still the
"Retribution," and by that name will be known and remembered.
The counsel for the claimants, in the course of his very able
argument, alluded to the cases of the "Sumter," and the
,, Georgia," both of which had been Confederate vessels of war,
and both of which had been transferred to neutrals. The inference that he ivould. draw from these instances is, that such transfers could not have been illegal. But this is assuming the very
point in controversy. When the legality of those transfers shall
have been affirmed by our judicial tribunals, then, and not till
then, can an argument in favor of the claimants be derived from
them.
in the contrary, these transactions only show the fre,quency and the facility with which such transfers are made, and
ought therefore to admonish us of the danger of sanctioning such
a practice. Let it be understood that such transactions are lawful, and we may look to see every rebel privateer, chased by our
cruisers into a neutral port, emerging in a few days clothed with
a British register-decked in new colors-and called by a new
name.
But it is insisted that this vessel, after her arrival at Nassau,
was, upon a survey, found to be unseaworthy, and thereupon sold
at public auction, and that Stead, the purchaser, thereby acquired
a valid title, which he -afterwards transferred to the claimants.
That there are circumstances under which the master of a merchant vessel may, in the absence of the owner, and upon a report
by surveyors of her unseaworthiness, sell her, so as to vest the
property in the purchaser, is undoubtedly true. But this is only
in a case of supreme necessity, whieh sweeps all ordinary rules
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before it. It must be a necessity which leaves no alternative,
which prescribes the law for itself, and puts the party in a positive state of compulsion to act. The master in such a case acts
for the owner, because he has no opportunity to act for himself.
If the property could be kept safely until he could be consulted,
and have an opportunity in a reasonable time to exercise his own
judgment as to the propriety of a sale, the necessity to act for
him would cease. It is not enough that the master acts in good
faith and for the interest of all concerned, if the requisite necessity-for the sale be not clearly made out. Not even the sanction
of a vice-admiralty court, much less the report of surveyors, will
aid the sale when the requisite necessity is wanting. The
master is employed only to navigate the ship, and the sale
of it is manifestly beyond his commission, and becomes the
unauthorized act of a servant, disposing of property which he
was intrusted only to carry and convey. This is the doctrine of
all the cases upon the subject, both in England and in this
country, and is sanctioned by the very highest authority : Idle
vs. The Royal .Exchange Insurance Co., 8 Taunt. 755 ; Bead vs.
Bonham, 8 Bro. & Bing. Rep. 147; Robertson vs. Olarke, 1
Bing. Rep. 445; Hfall vs. The Franklin Insurance Co., 9 Pickering 466; The Schooner Tilton, 5 Mason 465; 8 Kent's Com. (2d
ed.) 173.
Now it would not be difficult to show, from an examination of
the evidence in this case, that no such necessity existed as would
have justified the sale of this vessel, supposing it to have heen an
ordinary merchant ship. But no such examination is necessary,
for the vessel in question was, as we have already seen, not a
merchant vessel at all, but an armed vessel of war in the service
of the Confederate States. That the officer in command of a
war vessel of a belligerent can, under the pretence of her being
unseaworthy, have her condemned and sold in a neutral port, and
that a valid title can thus be acquired to her, is a proposition too
monstrous to merit a moment's discussion. The relation in which
such an officer stands towards those by whom he is commissioned and employed, is so entirely different from that which
subsists between the master of a merchant vessel and the owner,
that no rule drawn from the one can, under any possible circumstances, be applicable to the other. And even admitting that,
as between the captain of this vessel and her owners, the sale of
her under the circumstances was justifiable, still it was a transfer

